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Planning failures in less developed countries have
been attributed to many factors which may be
categorised broadly as administrative incapacity;
economic, social, cultural and religious
constraints; and political parameters determining
plan preparation and performance. lt is with the
political factors that we are particularly concerned
here. These appear to range from capricious,
plan-wrecking intervention to non-cooperation,
ambiguity in the statement of goals, lack of
political will to support necessary but unpopular
measures, and a general absence or weakness of
the political institutions essential to ensure plan
implementation.
A politician, Dr. Eric Williams of Trinidad, has
spoken in praise of planning as a good discipline
for politicians (Faber and Seers 1972: Vol I). If
politics is the art of the possible, he suggests
that planning is the science of the possible. The
discipline of marrying these two concepts in
practical terms is what many politicians find so
difficult. Failure of politicians to appreciate the
policy implications of a plan has led to
independent actions which disturb the planned
allocation of resources and ignore its require-
ments and constraints. A well known example
is that of politicians in Kenya encouraging local
people to build more Harambee rural secondary
schools than the Ministry of Education could
staff or equip within the national plan allocation.
National plans have been thrown off course by
changes in political priorities during the plan
period. Security often becomes a matter of
urgency resulting in the diversion of resources
from other sectors. In Lesotho social defence
planning included an advanced training centre
for young offenders. But it had only been in use
a few months when the Government com-
mandeered it to accommodate a new armed
security police unit. Revolutions, military coups
and coLinter COUPS are obvious examples of
political intervention leading to suspension.
abandonment, or at best a distortion of noional
plans.
Foreign policy objectives are admittedly difficult
to incorporate in a plan, but can in fact impose
constraints on implementation not only by
competing for scarce resources hut by having
the effect of reducing those resources. Trade
sanctions against a country on which one's own
is economically dependent is one example.
Another is provoking retaliatory political
sanctions that may result in the cutting off of
external aid. Thus Zambia has suffered severe
economic consquences from its policies towards
Rhodesia and the permanent closing of the
border, while Tanzania fell out for a time with
Britain and West Germany at the cost of aid
and investment.
1f foreign policy objectives tend to play some-
thing of a maverick role in the planning process,
and still more in implementation, there are some
domestic objectives that could not easily be built
into a pian. These objectives are often of an
ideological nature. There may he a political
coniniitment to rapid localisation of posts in the
public and private sectors which was not
disclosed at the time the plan was formulated.
The effects may be a loss of efficiency and
control, premature nationalisation of foreign
owned industrial, business and commercial
uadertakings requiring heavy government invest-
ment and payment of compensation, and the
creation of state trading enterprises more often
than not run at a substantial loss. This in turn
may lead to a loss of confidence by overseas
investors, and a lower rate of domestic invest-
ment than was needed to achieve the planned
growth target.
Planners should not assume total commitment
to rational planning by the governments that hire
them. Certainly goals may have been established
prior to the planning process. This is particularly
true in the case of countries with a history of
colonial dependence. The most important goals
are probably nation-building or national integra-
tion; establishing the legitimacy of the central
government among people more accustomed to
parochial loyalties centred on tribal or religious
affiliation: political penetration; recruitment and
socialisation to enlist popular participation and
support: and the management of the new elite
roles emerging from the modernisation process.
Such goals may he in competition with economic
planning objectives in the sense that they may be
assigned scarce human, material and financial
resources in order to build up the tolitical and
administrative institutions required for their
achievement. When these political developmental
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goals are uppermost there is a temptation for
politicians to proclaim the national plan simply
for prestige purposes. Politicians like to he
regarded as having a plan for modernisation,
progress and reforma kind of "magic book to
brandish at political meetings" (Leys in Faber
and Seers 1972: Vol I). But there is little idea
that this is more than an electioneering strategy,
a set of development slogans or a shopping list
of aspirations to which the electorate resonates.
Afterwards the plan is left to exist alongside the
pragmatic or opportunistic decision-making with
which the politician is more familiar.
Political failures in planning should not all
be laid at the door of the politicians themselves.
Planners also, by their knowledge and expertise,
are endowed with a kind of political power. The
plans they produce inevitably put constraints on
the politicians' power of decision-making. For
example, the planners may indicate reduced
public expenditure to restore a balance of
payments deficit and this may require fiscal
measures and cuts in social services which the
politicians know will be extremely unpopular.
The planners may call for politically delicate
measures like land reform, greater efficiency and
control of tax collection, more equality of oppor-
tunity in education, housing and employment,
or easier access for rural dwellers to services
like medical care which would imply less spending
on the urban services. Many such measures
would be unacceptable to politicians or the
powerful interests on which they depend. They
would therefore elicit no more than formal
assent with no substantive realisation in practice.
Another example from Tanzania illustrates the
problem of conflicting objectives. The planning
directorate, located in the President's office,
opted for a complete transformation of the
country's peasant agriculture by the setting up
of state farms, collectives and cooperatives. The
Ministry of Agriculture thought this was too
precipitate and preferred a programme designed
to improve existing practices without radically
changing the system (Pratt 1967). The planners
prevailed at the negotiating table but the trans-
formation policy, lacking the wholehearted
support of the Ministry of Agriculture, was a
failure and later abandoned.
This particular case is also an example of the
failure cf some planners to make a thorough
study of departmental policies and programmes in
advance. Instead they select objectives with the aid
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of the horoscope of their economic growth model
rather than from a range of revealed preferences
of the political leadership (Leys 1969). At the
same time they expect the politicians to abandon
or modify their own policies to conform with
the plan requirements. The political leaders may
give their assent, but experience has shown that
this does not necessarily imply commitment. On
the contrary when it comes to implementation
they may reserve the right to ignore the planners'
prescriptions in favour of their own priorities
which they may not have made known to the
planners in the first place. In some cases it may
simply be that they accept some of the plan
provisions without fully understanding their
implications, and then on finding that they clash
with their political preferences feel obliged to
ignore them. Either way leads to disarray, with
tug-of-war policies by different ministries substi-
tuting for the co-ordinated compliance expected
by the planners.
Finally there are exogenous constraints on
planning. These arise from a range of decisions
by foreign governments involving commodity
prices, import-export controls, currency manipula-
tion. and political pressures applied by aid
donors and investors. There is indeed a sense in
which a plan may be partly shaped or its
implementation affected by pressures from
Washington, London. Moscow. Peking. Geneva
o wherever the OPEC representatives next meet.
Because of these constraints, Apter (1970) asserts
that modernising societies exist in an essentially
hostile world, and the wealthy industrial countries
play a 'monitor' role at their expense. For
example, if a modernising country manages to
increase the production of a primary commodity,
the price on the international market is likely
to fall.
A consideration of these difficulties may suggest
a slightly malevolent role for politics as a
variable affecting planning. Another explanation,
however, may be too little political intervention
rather than too much. In many countries politics
in relation to planning has often been haphazard
and unpredictable. lt has functioned as an inter-
vening variable rather than an independent,
determinant variable giving direction and
coherence to the whole process of planning
and implementation. R. H. Jackson (Hyden,
Jackson and Okumu 1970) expresses the view
that politics should not be seen as imposing
constraints on economic rationality, but as a lever
by means of which plans and decisions justified
on economic grounds can be implemented.
PIanning", he says, "ought therefore to
incorporate a political theory no less than an
economic one, and planners should be guided
by political no less than economic knowledge".
Myrdal (1969: Vol III) sees plans as political
programmes and planning as part of a country's
political process. For Hanson (1966) planning is
a total process, dealing with economic problems
which for their solution demand social changes
triggered off by political action. This in turn has
a crucial role in ensuring that planned resources
are actually used.
A distinction is sometimes made between the
political organisational function as against the
technical aspect of planning (Leys 1969). The
former is concerned with the ways and means of
motivating human behaviour necessary to
achieve plan objectives. It is important for
planners to know in advance the 'price', in terms
of incentives, at which people will consent to
the changes in attitudes, behaviours and economic
activity assumed in the plan. The history of
planning shows that this is not often the case.
Soil conservation works in Lesotho consistently
failed to engage the 'activators' which would
have led to their acceptance by peasant farmers.
They were too complicated for the people to
understand. They appeared to provide no direct
benefits or short term results. They were intro-
duced from above by officials with a mixture
of persuasion and threats without adequate
efforts to obtain the views of the farmers in
advance or to secure their initial participation
in planning the schemes.
The harmful consequences of too little politics
in planning may be seen in different ways in
Tanzania and India. At independence in 1961
the Tanzania African National Union (TANU)
anchored itself firmly to a socialist ideology and
announced that this would be the guiding
principle in its development planning. Unfortu-
nately, however, Tanzanian socialism did not at
that time go much beyond a philosophical
enunciation. The party produced no planning
policy or objectives to implement its socialist
creed other than its proclamation of hard work,
freedom and unityUhuru na Kazi and Uhuru
na U,noja. The expatriate planners therefore
worked within the conventional framework of
industrial development, attracting investment of
any type, and agricultural improvement. The
result was quite contrary to the aims of TANU,
however imprecisely expressed. Social and
economic inequality was being reinforced by the
emergence of an African commercial and
professional middle class and, in the rural areas,
prosperous smallholder farmers. The early years
of the first plan also helped to preserve the
inherited tripartite division, European, Asian,
African, in that economic and social order. The
retention of most of the colonial capitalist
structuresa 'Trojan horse within the socialist
camp' (Saul 1971)was leading inevitably to the
creation of a capitalist society within a socialist
professing State. Thus there was "a rhetorical
commitment to socialist objectives, a technical
commitment to 'neutral' policy tools, and a
practical achievement of capitalist results" (Van
Arkadie 1972).
In India the case was somewhat different. The
Congress Party committed itself to socialism, but
also to democratic and non-authoritarian
procedures. This twin commitment has had
contradictory effects on the planning process. On
the one hand the political emphasis on social and
distributive justice created pressures to give
priority to rural welfare amenities at the expense
of more realistic economic policies, pushing the
planners towards achieving the Welfare State
simultaneously with or actually ahead of the
establishment of the economic base to sustain
it. There was also a bias towards labour at the
expense of management, which led to indiscipline
in the public and private sectors, and a socialist
disapproval of 'profits' which discouraged risk-
taking in the private sector and prompted a high
degree of nationalisation accompanied by rising
costs and loss of efficiency (Prasad in Faber and
Seers 1972: Vol 11).
On the other hand a commitment to democratic
consultation and participation gave rise to an
almost bewildering array of organised group,
caste and class pressures on the planners,
particularly at the states level, where demands
were made for even more decentralisation so
that local needs might be more effectively
represented. The political strength of the states
was thus augmented, especially against the
already hard-pressed centre. Failure to manage
such pressures led to departures from economic
rationality and exaggerated plan projections to
try to please everyone (Streeten and Lipton 1968).
¡ri the midst of all this big business interests
managed to exercise a considerable degree of
control over the socialist policies of the Congress
Party (Hanson 1966). The result has been a
contradiction between political profession and
behaviour, and the appearance in the plans of
unrealistic assumptions and ideological exhorta-
tians in place of firmly based measures to achieve
the targets. Radical commitments and reform
goals have been stated far in advance of actual
policies, which in fact have turned out to be
more conservative than socialist (Myrdal 1971).
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Reluctance to use controls to bring about the
radical changes necessary for redistribution of
wealth leads to a deteriorating situation and the
emergence of the 'soft' State or the price
indeterminacy of Riggs' 'prismatic' society (Riggs
1964), in which people are largely left to do
what they please---or what they have the means
to do. Inevitably this results in the extension
and consolidation of the power of the wealthy
elites who may comfortably assent to their
government's socialist ideology while doing
nothing about the continued exploitation,
deprivation, political apathy and alienation of
the poor majority.
The dangers and paradoxes inherent in the state
of affairs outlined above were perceived in the
course of Tanzania's first plan period in the
mid-1960s and led to political, structural,
administrative and planning changes aimed at
getting the nation back on to a socialist course.
The first step was the political unification of
Tanzania as a one-party State under the leader-
ship of President Nyerere and TANU. Next came
a clear statement of political objectives set out
in the Arusha declaration of 1967, emphasizing
public ownership, rural development, and self-
reliance in place of excessive dependence on
external sources of finance. Immediate steps were
taken to implement the declaration. Rural
development was to be promoted by bringing
scattered farm households together in ujumaa
villages where people farm the land cooperatively
and set up village institutions for planning and
implementation of improvements. TANU was
reorganised to enable it to function through
village cells, district and regional executive
committees linked to the National Executive at
the centre. G uidelinesMwongozowere issued
establishing the supreme policy-making role of
TANU but at the same time insisting on a
planning role for the ordinary people. "If
development is to benefit the people, the people
must participate in considering, planning and
implementing their development plans. The duty
of our party is to ensure that the leaders and
experts implement the plans that have been
agreed by the people themselves." (Mwongozo
1971).
These political institutional reforms were set
within a new framework of planning and
administrative decentralisation which began in
1972. At all levels TANU is powerfully repre-
sented through its organisational tiers and all
plans have to be approved by the party before
going to the central planning agency.
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It remains to be seen whether these changes have
provided the right mix for more realistic,
participatory planning and effective implementa-
tion. If the hopes of TANU are fulfilled,
Tanzania's system could offer a model for other
Third World country governments who wish to
translate their political professions of socialism
into planning reality.
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